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Randomized experiments to detect and estimate
social influence in networks
Sean J. Taylor and Dean Eckles
Abstract Estimation of social influence in networks can be substantially biased in observational studies due
to homophily and network correlation in exposure to exogenous events. Randomized experiments, in which
the researcher intervenes in the social system and uses randomization to determine how to do so, provide
a methodology for credibly estimating of causal effects of social behaviors. In addition to addressing ques-
tions central to the social sciences, these estimates can form the basis for effective marketing and public
policy.
In this review, we discuss the design space of experiments to measure social influence through com-
binations of interventions and randomizations. We define an experiment as combination of (1) a target
population of individuals connected by an observed interaction network, (2) a set of treatments whereby the
researcher will intervene in the social system, (3) a randomization strategy which maps individuals or edges
to treatments, and (4) a measurement of an outcome of interest after treatment has been assigned.We review
experiments that demonstrate potential experimental designs and we evaluate their advantages and tradeoffs
for answering different types of causal questions about social influence. We show how randomization also
provides a basis for statistical inference when analyzing these experiments.
Keywords Field experiments, causal inference, Fisherian randomization inference, social interactions,
spillovers, social networks
1 Introduction
There is a long tradition in the social sciences of examining how individual level behaviors diffuse and
aggregate, including influential work by Schelling (1969, 1971, 1973) and Granovetter (1978), among many
others (Ryan and Gross, 1943; Bass, 1969; Valente, 1996; Morris, 2000). Stylized models from this tradition
have been used to explain some of the most important human phenomena, fromwhich innovations are likely
to gain widespread usage to who people vote for in elections. The fundamental building blocks of diffusion
models are assumptions about how people change their behaviors in response to the behaviors of people
they observe or interact with. These assumptions can vary in their disciplinary origins and sophistication—
from epidemiological models to game-theoretic models with multiple equilibria.
Randomized experiments provide a useful tool for testing theories. The increasing digitization and con-
nectedness of human behaviors has made digital field experiments cheaper and easier to apply to social
behaviors via contemporary communication technologies. This methodological paradigm shift has created
opportunities for researchers hoping to understand the underpinnings of large-scale social behaviors in order
to improve theory, make predictions, and compare hypothetical policies.
In this review, we hope to make randomized experimentation more accessible to researchers seeking
to contribute to our understanding of mechanisms for social influence and diffusion in social systems. We
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first discuss how randomized experiments can rule out potential confounding factors (Section 1.1). Because
experiments require that the researcher intervenes in the social system, we devote Section 1.2 to discussing
the ethical consideration associated with employing digital field experiments.
Section 2 outlines the four components of a randomized experiment to detect or estimate social influence.
This facilitates discussing the many design choices experimenters have, including defining the relevant
network, what treatments can be employed, and how those treatments may be randomly assigned to subjects.
In Section 3, we turn to the analysis of experiments in networks, where we focus on Fisherian randomization
inference. Section 4 discusses how the analysis of experiments can be extended in various ways in order to
increase the usefulness of the results.
This review complements more general references on design and analysis of randomized experiments
(Gerber and Green, 2012; Athey and Imbens, 2017; Imbens and Rubin, 2015). Design and analysis with
disjoint groups, has received substantial attention in economics and epidemiology (e.g., Saul et al, 2017;
Halloran and Hudgens, 2016; Baird et al, 2016; VanderWeele et al, 2012). On the other hand, there are few
other reviews of design and analysis of experiments in networks. Comparedwith extant reviews (Aral, 2016;
Walker and Muchnik, 2014), we aim to integrate all the methods reviewed into a single causal model and
discuss some design choices and analysis methods in detail.
What exactly counts as social influence? Different fields distinguish among various processes by which
people affect each other. For example, economists distinguish between peer effects caused by constraint,
preference, and expectation interactions (Manski, 2000), while other fields may make different distinc-
tions. Thus, for some prior work, “social influence” denotes something more specific. However, given our
methodological focus here, we choose to remain agnostic about the mechanisms and define social influence
to include all processes by which an individual’s behaviors affect another’s, either directly or indirectly.
Thus, we could have instead referred to “peer effects”, “diffusion”, or “social contagion”. Further theory-
specific distinctions may motivate additional design and analysis choices.
1.1 What makes randomized experiments different?
We privilege information gained through randomized experiments because they create a different kind of
knowledge than observational studies. In particular, because we know exactly how units are assigned to
treatments, a properly implemented experiment rules out all alternative explanations for an observed corre-
lation besides the causal one, and allows for both unbiased estimation of the effect of our intervention and
statistical inference that is exact in finite samples (Fisher, 1935).
Any observational analysis intended to answer questions about social influence must confront sev-
eral potential biases that make it difficult to trust its conclusions. First, social networks are known to
exhibit strong homophily (McPherson et al, 2001; Marmaros and Sacerdote, 2006; Currarini et al, 2010;
Kossinets and Watts, 2006), creating network correlation of attributes, opinions, and behaviors through peo-
ple’s preferences for whom they spend time with. For instance, people with similar political beliefs may be
more likely to form friendships (Bakshy et al, 2015; Halberstam and Knight, 2016; Huber and Malhotra,
2017), and therefore homophily may readily explain cases of apparent political persuasion. Second, people
who are connected in social networks are subject to similar exogenous shocks to their behavior, as when
neighbors are exposed to similar marketing messages on billboards.
A substantial program of research has been devoted to proving that what economists call “identification
problems” in social influence are likely to be insurmountable without randomized experiments (Manski,
1993; Shalizi and Thomas, 2011). The intuitive reason is that without intervening in the social system,
there are usually reasonable alternative explanations for correlations that do not involve a social influence
effect.
Despite their clear advantages, the use of randomized experiments is not a panacea for social scien-
tists. Experiments are usually more costly to design and implement than observational studies because the
researcher must alter people’s behaviors or interactions in social system in some way. Interventions re-
quire substantial upfront costs for planning and implementation, including: recruitment of subjects, cost of
the interventions themselves (financial or logistical), evaluation and exposure of risks of harm to subjects
(Jackman and Kanerva, 2016). Because field experiments require researchers to impact the social systems
they study at potentially very large scale, they can be associated with larger or different ethical challenges
from other methods, which we summarize in Section 1.2.
Experiments can also be problematic because, although they reduce concerns about bias, the variance of
estimation becomes a first-order concern and the possibility of type II errors (commonly known as issues
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Table 1 Ethical principles for human subjects research.
Principle Description
Respect for Persons Treating people as autonomous and acting in accordance with their wishes.
Beneficence Recognizing the potential risks and benefits of research and striking a bal-
ance between them.
Justice Ensuring that the risks and benefits of research are fairly distributed.
Respect for Law
and Public Interest Recognizing the risks and benefits for all relevant stakeholders, not just re-
search subjects.
with experimental power) dominate due to the cost of sample size or the impossibility of the researcher
creating large effects (Bakshy and Eckles, 2013).
On a more positive note, we will see in Section 3 that some well-designed experiments can require
more straightforward analysis than observational studies. In addition, there are no internal validity concerns
with experiments – they provide unbiased estimates for the social influence effects they were designed to
measure. The two main constraints of an experimental methodology are which estimates are possible and
the precision of those estimates.
The randomization the researcher employs and structure of the network together determine what causal
quantities of interest can be credibly estimated (Toulis and Kao, 2013). These estimands address counter-
factual questions about which individual-level behaviors would obtain under alternative interventions. In
one simple case, we may be able answer the question of how much an individual’s probability of a behav-
ior is increased by having exactly one peer (rather than no peers) who engages in that behavior. A more
complex causal estimand might be the distribution of that behavior in the total population after a series of
targeted (e.g., marketing) interventions or a policy change (e.g., by a government). As we will see, no sin-
gle experiment can answer all possible causal questions and the experiment should be designed with some
estimands in mind.
The second constraint from using experiments is the precision of the effect estimates. Experimental
data is often more costly to collect than observational data because treatments are not free and because
observational data is abundant. In general, the precision of the estimates of social influence are limited
by the direct effects of the intervention (weaker ones provide less experimental power) and the available
sample size (Gerber and Green, 2012).
1.2 Ethical considerations for digital field experiments
The reduced cost and increased feasibility of digital field experiments (DFEs) has led to increased experi-
mentation over the past decade. While DFEs may help researchers answer many important questions about
social influence, they can present more ethical challenges than observational research and even pre-digital
lab and field experiments. To ground the discussion, we will refer to the four ethical principles proposed in
the Belmont Report (Resea and Ryan, 1978) and the subsequent Menlo Report (Dittrich et al, 2012) which
are meant to provide guidance on human subjects research. Those principles – Respect for Persons, Benef-
icence, Justice, and Respect for Law and Public Interest – are briefly summarized principles in Table 1.
For an in-depth, thorough treatment of ethics in research in the digital age, we refer the reader to Chapter
6 of Salganik (2017) and for a recent discussion of institutional review processes to mitigate risk please see
Jackman and Kanerva (2016). Rather than review those materials exhaustively, we use this subsection to
discuss five ethical considerations that we consider to be particularly salient for digital field experiments.
First, DFEs are implemented in software and therefore have very low variable costs with respect to the
size of the treated population. It is no longer unusual for experiments to deploy treatments to millions of
people (Bond et al, 2012), amplifying their potential harm compared to more modest sample sizes. Ad-
ditionally, treatments with network effects can, by research intention or not, cause detrimental effects for
people who were not in the original treated population. Researchers acting in accordance with the ethical
principle of Beneficence may have a more difficult time evaluating the potential risks of DFEs in networks
because their potential effects on social systems are not obvious, intuitive, or even measured.
Second, it may be difficult to identify whether subjects in DFEs are members of a vulnerable or protected
population. When designing a DFE, researchers might find it challenging to estimate risks of harm because
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there is uncertainty about how many subjects could be adversely affected. Researchers might also be unable
to reason about whether the benefits and risks of the research are distributed equitably across the population,
in accordance with the principle of Justice. On many online or mobile platforms, researchers may not know
if users are a reasonable age for consent or are particularly vulnerable to risk from the planned experiment.
Third, DFEs typically use automated, large-scale collection of potentially sensitive and/or identifying
information, e.g. location information or exchange of personal communication. Indeed, these data can
be integral to the ability of the experiment to answer the research question of interest. For instance, a
log of email communications can be used to infer a social network (Kossinets and Watts, 2006), which
is a key component for social influence studies. Persistent records of sensitive or identifying informa-
tion can potentially be used for unintended purposes, causing harm to experimental subjects (Ohm, 2010;
Narayanan and Shmatikov, 2010).
Fourth, because of their large scale and integration with existing technologies, DFEs often pose unique
challenges for receiving informed consent, which is sometimes an implication of the ethical principle of
Respect for Persons. Informing subjects of the experiment and receiving their consent can be disruptive to
their normal experiences using various platforms and products (particularly if experiments are frequent, as
is becoming more common). Furthermore, requiring informed consent can limit or bias the experimental
population or prime the subjects, undermining or altering the treatment effects. Although informed con-
sent is important component of Respect for Persons, deception may be permissible if the experiment com-
plies with all other ethical principles and the deception does not strongly violate the norms of that setting
(Riach and Rich, 2004). Some experiments with potentially important benefits require deception in order
ensure the research question can be suitably answered. For instance, in the employment discrimination field
experiments Riach and Rich (2004) discuss, one could not credibly measure discrimination after informing
employers of the nature of the research.
Fifth, it may be difficult for researchers to comply with all laws, contracts, terms of service, or social
norms because DFEs may involve partnerships with companies, span countries or other legal boundaries,
or include subjects from many cultures. Inconsistent, overlapping, and sometimes unclear rules and norms
lead to challenges for researchers hoping to understand all potential stakeholders and their associated goals
and risks.
These five considerations are not meant to be exhaustive – there are certainly other ways in which DFEs
can present new ethical challenges for researchers. But we hope that this subsection has made clear that
while experimental research has become easier to conduct on some dimensions, it has become more fraught
on others – in particular in evaluating and mitigating the risk of harm to subjects.
1.2.1 Recommendations for ethical research
Taking into account the challenges identified, more research is needed to address the ethical implications in
DFEs and to develop mitigating and creative strategies. In the meantime, researchers should do the utmost
to:
• Ensure that the research is ethical and beneficial for subjects; that it does not expose them to risk or harm
(this may require escalation and further deliberation with other teams within the company, along with
the assessment of alternative research methods that could be used).
• Carefully assess if the collection and processing of sensitive data is essential for the research being
conducted.
• Determine if an experiment is strictly necessary for the objectives of the research (or if the same results
can be obtained through less risky research, e.g. a smaller sample size).
• Whenever possible, ensure that such collection and processing is done with prior informed consent given
by the data subjects.
• Only keep that data for the minimum necessary period of time and ensure the proper de-identification of
that data according to most effective and updated industry standards.
2 Components of a randomized experiment
The randomized experiment methodology has four main components:
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Table 2 Definitions of terminology and notation used in this review. See Figure 2.1 for a graphical depiction of the relationship
between these quantities.
Term Definition
Xi a vector of pre-treatment covariates about subject i
Ui a vector of unobserved covariates about subject i
D j a behavior of the peer j that could affect the subject i
Ai j edge between i and j in the interaction network that mediates social
influence
Z j researcher-determined treatment status for peer j.
Wi j researcher-determined treatment status for relationship i j
Yi the outcome of interest for subject i, measured post-treatment
subject a focal individual whose outcome variable Yi is studied
peer the person whose behavior D j could influence Yi
1. A target population of units (i.e. individuals, subjects, vertices, nodes) who are connected by some
interaction network. (Section 2.1)
2. A treatment which can plausibly affect behaviors or interactions. (Section 2.2)
3. A randomization strategy mapping units to probabilities of treatments. (Section 2.3)
4. An outcome behavior or attitude of interest and measurement strategy for capturing it. (Section 2.4)
To summarize the relationship of these components, the researcher applies a treatment (2) to a target
population (1) using a randomization strategy (3) and then measures the outcome behavior (4).
The following four sections describe these four components, characterize the space of possibilities for
each one, and provide examples from existing research. We introduce notation along the way that we will
use in Sections 3 and 4. For convenience that notation is summarized in Table 2. Lowercase letters designate
particular fixed values of interest.
2.1 Target population and interaction network
The target population is the set of people whose interactions and behaviors the researcher seeks to study. If
we were studying whether peers affect which movies we choose to watch, the population of interest might
be movie-goers. Before and during the experiment the target population generates some data, which we list
here:
• We observe N individuals from some target population, indexed by i. This might be a sample or it may
be the entire finite population.
• We observe pre-treatment covariates for the individuals: Xi. Commonly researchers collect demo-
graphic information such as gender, physical location, or age. Often it is also useful to measure pre-
experimental behaviors that are similar to the outcome of interest.
• We observe an interaction network between people in the population Ai j where i, j ∈ [1, . . . ,N]; alter-
natively, this is a network G= (V,E). This interaction network determines an exposure model — which
individuals we expect to potentially influence each other and with what intensity.
• We observe when the population engages in some behavior of interest Di.
• We observe some outcome variable associated with each individual, Yi. For instance the researcher
might survey them to ask often they smoke. We will discuss outcome measurement in more depth in
Section 2.4.
Substantively, we care about the effect of the behavior D j on the outcome Yi in the population. The
special case where Di = Yi can be termed in-kind peer effects and is frequently studied, but it is easy to
envision cases where the peer behavior of interest is different from the outcome (e.g. my friend’s studying
habits, measured as D j, affect my probability of applying to college, Yi).
Selecting the target population often involves tradeoffs between external validity and the ability to collect
data about behaviors, outcomes of interest, and relevant social interactions — and intervene. Researchers
have used the following three strategies to solve this recruitment problem.
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Yi
Xi
Ui
Ai j
D jZ j
X j
U j Wi j
Fig. 1 Causal diagram for the random variables in our example. Squares are observed variables and circles are unobserved.
Here i is the ego or focal subject for whom we will measure outcome Yi . We believe that her friend j can affect Yi through
her behavior D j, which is affected by our treatment Z j . The strength of their friendship, Ai j can moderate this effect and is
exogenously affected by treatmentWi j . Ui and U j are unobserved confounders that cause i and j to become friends and may
also affect D j and Yi . By conditioning on Ai j , the backdoor path indicated by the dashed line is activated and provides an
alternative explanation for any association we observe between D j and Yi.
First, researchers have continued to recruit convenience samples. As with classic lab experiments in so-
cial influence (e.g. Asch, 1955), these are often students from universities and colleges for studies. These
samples can facilitate either construction of artificial networks or measuring the subjects’ networks (with,
e.g., surveys, asking them to log into Facebook, measuring co-location). The later strategy can be used to
conduct “lab experiments in the field” as existing networks are combining with artificial choices and treat-
ments (e.g., Leider et al, 2009). The former strategy has been increasingly been used in combination with
online labor markets (such as Amazon’s Mechanical Turk), which has created an important new source
of experimental subjects (Mason and Suri, 2012). These individuals can be assigned to positions in net-
works by researchers or through economic games played by the subjects themselves (Suri and Watts, 2011;
Mason and Watts, 2012; Rand et al, 2011, 2014); of course, this may limit external validity.
Second, the last decade has led to a dramatic increase in experiments that are conducted on online social
networks or in collaboration with the companies that run online communication services. Aral and Walker
(2011, 2012) constructed a Facebook application in order to gather social network information, introduce
a treatment (presence of viral features), and measure the outcome of interest (adoption of the application).
Other researchers have worked directly with Internet firms to conduct experiments. Bond et al (2012) and
Taylor et al (2013) conducted experiments by implementing them in partnership with Facebook (see Bond
et al., this volume), while Muchnik et al (2013) partnered with a social news website to introduce an exper-
imental change.
Third, researchers in education, development, labor economics, and ecology have conducted ambitious
field experiments in samples of schools or classrooms (Carrell et al, 2009; Paluck et al, 2016), villages
(Kim et al, 2015; Cai et al, 2015), and herds of animals (Aplin et al, 2015; Firth et al, 2016) for which net-
works can be measured.
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2.1.1 Measuring or constructing the interaction network
We use the term “interaction network”, which is vague, because what is usually denoted by “social network”
will often not be the causal network of interest.1 In most settings there is some specific type of interaction
we hypothesize to transmit the behavior we care about. The most intuitive definition is that interaction is “i
considers j to be her friend,” but, even when this can be operationalized, further consideration of a particular
research question may lead to other reasonable choices:
• i saw a story j posted on Facebook (Bakshy et al, 2012b)
• i is made aware that her friend j likes a product (Bakshy et al, 2012a)
• i lives with j in a dormitory for a year (Sacerdote, 2001)
• i lives in the same household as j (Nickerson, 2008)
• i is in the same training class as j (Carrell et al, 2009)
The researcher hopes that the chosen network captures salient interactions for the influence process she
expects. This definition can vary depending on the outcome behavior of interest. In the case of the Sacerdote
(2001), who study educational outcomes, the interaction network is prolonged co-habitation, while in the
case of Bakshy et al (2012a), who study clicks on ads, it is merely that a Facebook friend’s name can
appear next to an advertisement. A more prolonged, socially important interaction network can plausibly
cause larger changes in subject behavior. In the former case, the the researchers can study changes in more
important and ingrained behaviors like studying habits, while in the latter the researchers must study more
proximate outcomes (clicks on ads).
There are many different possibilities for measuring, eliciting, or directly constructing interaction net-
works. If the research setting is an articulated social network, (e.g. an online social network such as Face-
book, Instagram, Twitter, or Pinterest) the researcher may use that network’s definition (followers, friends,
subscriptions). This approach is convenient but often not the precise interaction network of interest. Most
people have online “friends” with whom they never interact in person, as well as “real life” friends who
they have not articulated ties with online. Facebook, Instagram, and Twitter use algorithmic ranking to de-
termine which content users see, meaning that a friend or follow relationship on those platforms may not
necessarily imply content visibility. If the plausible mechanism of influence is offline, then using an online
network might bias estimates of causal effects. A misspecification of the interaction network can, even with
randomization, bias measurement of social effects.
In digital settings, interaction networks may be constructed incrementally as people’s interactions in
the social system are logged (i.e. Ai j = 1 if i chatted with person j during the study). For instance in
Bakshy et al (2012a), the interaction network is determined by Facebook users seeing advertisements during
their browsing sessions. The salient interaction network is easily captured by logging which users see which
ads. In addition, logging the interactions which have the potential for transmitting behaviors can improve
precision by omitting interactions with no potential to transmit influence. Bakshy et al (2012a) could have
used other definitions of the interaction network (e.g. Facebook friendship), but these would have yielded
biased and/or higher variance estimates of effects.
Like observational research [e.g., the USNational Longitudinal Study of Adolescent Health (AddHealth)
study (Resnick et al, 1997)], much measurement of social networks for randomized experiments has in-
volved asking subjects who their friends, kin, etc., are. The specific questions can be selected to elicit the
possibly domain-specific network of interactions. For example, Cai et al (2015) asked heads of rural house-
holds to household heads to list five friends that they most frequently discuss farming and finance with,
anticipating that this would be a relevant network for social influence in adoption of weather insurance and
spillovers from their intervention. Such questions require being able to uniquely identify the named peers,
which may be challenging in the presence of common names and/or limited literacy. Kim et al (2015) thus
used a complete photographic census of the villages in which they planning to intervene. When the goal is
to measure an objective fact about behavioral interactions, incentives for subjects to truthfully report their
friends and tie-strength to researchers could be helpful. For example, Leider et al (2009) use a game in
which individuals report how much time they spend with peers and paying them more money if this report
matches the peer’s report.
Researchers can infer interaction networks from communication meta-data, especially when it covers
enough time to precisely measure interaction rates and the communication medium (e.g. email) is likely to
be the medium through which influence is transmitted. Influential observational research has measured net-
works by counting exchanges of emails (Kossinets and Watts, 2006) or instant messages (Aral et al, 2009).
1 Another related term is “exposure model” – a model that determines which subjects are exposed to which other subjects.
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Beyond allowing for constructing a binary network, directed behaviors between individuals predict self-
reported tie strength (Jones et al, 2013). In a a randomized experiment, these measures can then be used
to estimate how spillovers (Bond et al, 2012) or social influence (Bakshy et al, 2012a,b; Aral and Walker,
2014; Bond et al, 2016) vary by tie strength. Choices by researchers in inferring networks from communi-
cations data can be non-trivial and have a substantive impact on results (De Choudhury et al, 2010).
Finally, studies can be designed to directly construct the interaction network for the subjects, a strategy
which is enabled by running digital experiments even if they happen to be conducted synchronously in
behavioral research labs (Kearns et al, 2006; Mason and Watts, 2012; Rand et al, 2011, 2014). For example,
Suri and Watts (2011) randomly vary the networks on which Amazon Mechanical Turkers play a public
goods game. Since creating the interaction network requires the researcher to intervene in the social system,
we will discuss this strategy in more depth in Section 2.2.
2.1.2 Extensions to this framework
Thus far we have described a randomized experiment with a single time period of post-treatment observation
and a single outcome of interest. The DAG in Figure 2.1 does not allow for the subject’s behavior to affect
the peer’s behavior, which in turn affects the subject’s behavior. There are two simple extensions which
may be useful and more realistic. First, we might study the outcome at different points in time (e.g. instead
of Di and Yi we might observe Di(t) and Yi(t) where t denotes either discrete or continuous time. Time-
dependent behavior is a challenging empirical setting because the researcher will often need to model
how the interaction network varies across time, as well as how the individual behavior evolves over time
(Rock et al, 2016).
The second extension is from a single peer behavior and outcome of interest to multiple behaviors and
outcomes. We might observe a set of people make decisions about a collection of products, ads, content
items, or behaviors, meaning we would measure Dik and Yik, where k indexes the items. Multiple items
present an important opportunity to observe social influence processes play out repeatedly in the same pop-
ulation of individuals across the same interaction network. Studies which measure effects across multiple
behaviors might provide a more generalizable estimate of effects or allow the researcher to understand effect
heterogeneity on other dimensions. As we discuss in Section 3.3, this may offer additional opportunities in
analysis.
2.2 Experimental treatments
Treatments are the means by which the researcher intervenes in the social system. The space of treatments
is often very limited based on cost and practical constraints, risks to subjects, and simply what changes a
researcher can possibly apply in a social system.
We will consider the researcher intervening by setting variables Z j andWi j, usually through some ran-
dom assignment procedure. Note that we do not assume the researcher can directly change D j and Ai j, as
these variables are chosen by individuals and can often only be affected through the researcher-controlled
instruments. The case where this is possible is the special case of perfect compliance, which is rare in field
experiments. Instead, we posit a (potentially estimable) compliance model that produces D j and Ai j and
which may also include pre-treatment variables and random noise. This section focuses on defining these
treatments; we defer their random assignment to Section 2.3 below.
2.2.1 Subject-level treatments
A binary subject-level treatment is denoted by Z j ∈ {0,1}, where Z j = 0 by default, and where this treat-
ment is expected to affect behavior such that D j(z j) = fi(z j,ε j), with observed D j = fi(Z j ,ε j). The direct
effects of the treatment may sometimes be of interest (e.g., effects of a message on voter turnout), but the
idea here is that Z j functions as an encouragement or instrumental variable with respect to D j, allowing
interpretation of spillovers from treatment as social influence via D j. Thus, researchers can create these
treatments primarily for this purpose of detecting social influence. For the treatment to be effective as an
instrument, we must believe that fi is such that changing Z j sometimes changes D j; for example, perhaps
D j(z j) = 1{α +β z j+ ε j > 0} with β 6= 0, which can be tested. Many interventions (e.g., providing infor-
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mation, advertisements) cause only small changes changes in the behavior, making detecting downstream
social influence difficult.
The special case where D j = Z j is known as perfect compliance. Noncompliance may also be only
one-sided, such that if Z j = 1 then D j = 1. Say we are interested in social influence in adoption of a paid
upgrade of an music streaming service. We could, as do Bapna and Umyarov (2015), purchase the upgrade
for a active users at random, thus producing one-sided, rather than two-sided, noncompliance (i.e. users
could still purchase the upgrade on their own if we did not).2 Two-sided noncompliance seems to be more
common in the social sciences, particularly among the difficult-to-change behaviors which are often most
interesting to study (e.g., health behaviors, costly product purchases).
Experiments using subject-level treatments within groups (i.e., networks consisting of disconnected
cliques) to detect and estimate social influence — sometimes called partial population experiments
(Moffitt et al, 2001) — have been adopted in economics and political science (Angelucci and De Giorgi,
2009; Duflo and Saez, 2003; Forastiere et al, 2015; Miguel and Kremer, 2004; Nickerson, 2008). These de-
signs are based on the expectation that treating a fraction of subjects can induce detectable changes in the
population of individuals connected to them. A smaller number of such experiments have been conducted
in networks; these too have often relied on having a network multiple connected components (e.g., villages,
schools) (e.g. Paluck et al, 2016; Kim et al, 2015; Cai et al, 2015; Coppock et al, 2015) with few exceptions
(Bond et al, 2012).
Knowledge of the interaction network can be crucial for the success of subject-level treatments. If there is
uncertainty about which peers may be affected by a subject’s treatment, then detecting effects can become
more burdensome from a statistical standpoint because omitting edges or including irrelevant ones adds
additional random variation in estimation.
2.2.2 Interaction-network treatments
In an interaction-network treatment, the researcher intervenes by setting Wi j, which affects the inter-
action network of the subjects in the experiment; that is, Ai j(wi j) = gi j(wi j,Ui,U j,νi j), with observed
Ai j = gi(Wi j,Ui,U j,νi j). As above, if Ai j is binary we may posit that Ai j(wi j) = 1{γ + δwi j + νi j > 0}
with δ 6= 0. Then particular edges may exist (δ > 0) or not (δ < 0) because of the treatment.
In the edge-formation case of δ > 0, we have treatments such as suggesting that two people become
friends or introducing them (Backstrom and Leskovec, 2011; Schultz et al, 2012). Not all suggested edges
will form, but we expect that some will. Researchers sometimes define the interaction network such that
there is perfect compliance. There are numerous examples of randomized group formation with ostensibly
perfect compliance. Hasan and Koning (2017) use a novel group randomization to understand how the
constituents of groups affect ideation. Sacerdote (2001) and Carrell et al (2009) use random assignment
of college roommates and squadrons in order to understand how these groups affect various learning and
development outcomes. Note that the degree of “compliance” depends on how the network is defined.
Although roommate assignment creates perfect compliance for the network of roommates, there is still
two-sided noncompliance for the network of friendships.
Encouraging edge removal, preventing formation, or attenuating interaction (δ < 0) can also be possible,
if challenging in practice, and would rely on the researcher discouraging at least one type of interaction
between individuals in the population. As an extreme example, researchers studying smoking cessation
could ask subjects to delete phone contacts for any friend they believe might encourage them to continue
smoking.
In the context of online communication technologies, whether some binary treatment should be under-
stood as encouraging or discouraging interaction is relative to an arbitrary and temporary status quo. For
example, Eckles et al (2016) analyze an intervention that modifies the display of i’s posts to j, varying the
salience of the user interface elements for commenting on the post.
Perfect compliance, or at least one-sided noncompliance, can also occur when there is some exhaustive
channel by which interaction occurs. For example, Aral and Walker (2012) randomize along which edges
notification for their Facebook application are sent, thus defining an interaction network that is a random
subset of the Facebook friendship network. Similarly, Bakshy et al (2012a) randomize whether whether or
not a friend appears as social context for an advertisement. We have elsewhere called these mechanism
2 Of course, in such cases we may wonder whether D j (i.e. having the upgrade) was really the behavior we were interested in.
Perhaps so — if most of the effects of peers’ upgrades on subjects would be via a single indicator on the peers’ profiles that
they had upgraded.
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experimental designs since they randomize whether particular mechanisms for social influence are active
(Eckles et al, 2016).
2.3 Randomization strategy
A randomization strategy φ specifies a probability distribution over treatment assignments; here piφ (Z) or
piφ (W ), where Z is the N-vector of subject-level treatments Zi andW is the matrix of edge-level treatments
Wi j. The marginal distribution is thus a function that maps a subject ( j) or edge (i j) to probability of
treatment. More advanced experiments might additionally allow this function to depend on pre-treatment
covariates X j or the existing interaction network Ai j. The specific form of the randomization determines
what causal questions the experiment is capable of, or especially suitable for, answering.
2.3.1 Implementing randomization
In practice, researchers tend to implement randomization using deterministic cryptographic hash functions
to generate pseudo-random variables with specified distributions (Kohavi et al, 2012; Bakshy et al, 2014).
PlanOut is a domain-specific language for specifying randomization strategies that is used at Facebook and
several other companies.3 Using variable-specific crypographic salts, PlanOut provides functionality for
independent random assignment for multiple experiments, multiple variables, and multiple types of units
(e.g., users, clusters, items, edges). The determinism of the hash functions ensures that a random assignment
is “persistent”, without requiring the assignments be stored; that is, the assignments can be computed online
and statelessly, as subjects arrive. PlanOut code implementing the i.i.d. randomization we described in the
previous paragraph as well as some more advanced randomizations are shown in Listing 1.
Listing 1 Example PlanOut code for subject-level treatment assignment.
# i.i.d. random assignment
smoking_program = uniformChoice(choices=[0,1], unit=subject_id);
# block random assignment
smoking_program = uniformChoice(choices=[0,1], unit=subject_group_id);
# hierarchical block random assignment
smoking_program_prob = randomFloat(min=0, max=1, unit=subject_group_id);
smoking_program = bernoulliTrial(p=smoking_program_prob, unit=subject_id);
2.3.2 Subject-level treatment randomizations
Here we consider randomizations for subject-level treatments. Consider the simplest possible randomization
for a subject-level treatment is independent and identically distributed (i.i.d) Bernoulli random variable:
Z j ∼ Bernoulli(0.5).4 Say Z j is assignment to a smoking prevention program. We hypothesize that the
programwill reduce howmuch people in the study smoke (i.e.D j is lower in expectation when Z j = 1), and
are further interested in using this randomization to learn about social influence in smoking. In the context
of disjoint groups (i.e. a network consisting of multiple disjoint cliques), we can think of this randomization
as a partial population experiment (Moffitt et al, 2001; Baird et al, 2016), in that some of the population is
treated and we can study behavior of their peers. This design is analogous to marketing interventions which
seek to exploit spillovers or network effects in demand by providing discounts or promotions to a small
subset of consumers (Hartmann, 2010).
In order for our randomization to enable detecting and estimating social influence, we will generally
need variation in the treatments of the peers of our subjects. While many measures of peer treatment can be
used, we will illustrate the points in this section with the fraction of i’s peers who are treated:
3 The design of PlanOut is described in Bakshy et al (2014) and it is available from https://github.com/facebook/planout.
4 Often the literature on randomized experiments (e.g., Gerber and Green, 2012; Imbens and Rubin, 2015) starts with a com-
pletely randomized design, in which some fixed number N1 of the N subjects are assigned to treatment. However, in the case of
large digital field experiments implemented as described in Section 2.3.1, this cannot easily be done in online (i.e. streaming)
assignment without complications.
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i.i.d. assignment on
balanced groups
0 1
hierarchical assignment
on balanced groups
0 1
i.i.d. assignment on
small world network
0 1
clustered assignment on
small world network
0 1
Fig. 2 Various subject-level randomizations illustrating how they each induce different distributions of treatment status for
a subject’s friends. Each of the four squares is an adjacency matrix (dots represent undirected friendships). The horizontal
grey bars represent treatment probabilities, with the darkest color indicating treatment is assigned to subjects in that row with
100% probability. The stylized histograms beneath the squares indicate the fraction of friends who are treated induced by the
randomization strategy above it.
Ti =
N
∑
j=1
A¯i jZ j,
where A¯i j = Ai j/∑Nj=1Ai j an entry in the row-normalized adjacency matrix, with A¯i j = 0 if ∑
N
j=1Ai j = 0.
The i.i.d. subject-level assignment described above and shown in the third panel of Figure 2.3.2 has
a very important limitation: if a subject has a substantial number of peers, then there is a vanishingly
small probability that they will all be assigned to treatment; for example, if subject i has 10 peers then
Pr(Ti = 1) = Pr(∑10i=1Z j = 10)< .01. So we are unlikely to be able to use an experiment with this type of
randomization to answer counterfactual questions about having all (or even a large percentage) of a person’s
friends participate in the program. For some asymptotic sequences with growing degree, this will mean the
variance of sample means for units with, e.g., all treated peers diverges (Ugander et al, 2013). Thus, we will
often want to consider other randomizations.
At the opposite extreme, we could assign treatment at the level of groups or clusters. For instance if
students are grouped by classrooms, we could do the smoking prevention assignment at the classroom-
level. Let c( j) be the classroom for subject j. Then a group-level randomization would be to assign each
group an i.i.d Bernoulli, Pc ∼ Bernoulli(0.5) and assign each student her group’s assignment, Z j = Pc( j). If
we think the classrooms are disjoint cliques, we might posit an interaction network that is a block-diagonal
matrix, such that Ai j = 1{c(i) = c( j)}. Note that in the case of disjoint groups, such an “everyone or
nobody” randomization abandons the partial population idea. This randomization can help answer questions
about what will happen should we deploy the program to everyone, but it cannot answer questions about
social influence and thus whether the program can be deployed more cost-effectively by treating a smaller
proportion of students. We may be able to dramatically reduce smoking in a classroom by encouraging
25% of the students to not smoke. In this group randomization, we will never observe a classroom with any
quantity other than 0% or 100% of the students treated; see the first panel of Figure 2.3.2.
Intermediate designs between these two extremes use a hierarchical (or, in this case, two-stage) random-
ization to creates additional dispersion in the quantity of students per classroom assigned to the treatment,
but also makes subject’s own treatment and their peers not perfectly dependent. For example, we can first
draw a random uniform variable per classroom, Pg ∼ Uniform(0,1), and then for each student, we draw a
Bernoulli random variable with their group’s probability, Z j ∼ Bernoulli(pc( j)).
5 For some randomization
5 With a small number of groups, we may want to use a completely randomized design, rather than independent draws of Pc
Baird et al (2016) consider optimal two-stage randomizations in the context of disjoint groups, given the goal of estimating
some particular direct or indirect effects.
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ψ , we call it overdispersed because Varψ (Ti) > Variid(Ti); that is, it greater variability in the fraction of
peers treated than from i.i.d. subject-level randomizations. An overdispersed randomization could be useful
for selecting a number of students to treat per classroom, given some budget, that will minimize smoking
because it can provide an estimate smoking behavior under different many levels of treatment.
Block-diagonal networks (e.g., villages assumed to not interact) make overdispersed randomizations
easy to implement. With more general networks, there are more design choices, and it can be difficult to
generate arbitrary degrees of overdispersion in friend treatment assignment probabilities. We would like
a randomization such that the distribution of Ti has certain properties; for example, one heuristic, is we
should have that Pr(Ti = k) > ε for all feasible fractions k given i’s degree. Or we may aim to maximize
Pr(Ti = k) for k ∈ {0,1}. One recently popular way to do so is to partition the network into clusters using
existing graph partitioning algorithms, and then proceed with the cluster-randomized design (i.e. graph
cluster randomization; Ugander et al, 2013; Eckles et al, 2017; Xu et al, 2015). Given the structure of the
network, there will still be edges between clusters (fourth panel in Figure 2.3.2). For example, say we use
state-of-the art methods to partitioning the Facebook friendship network; with only 1,000 clusters, already
over 40% of edges will be between clusters (Shalita et al, 2016). Not only is graph partitioning challenging
in large networks, but standard min-cut objectives will often just be a heuristic: we would instead prefer
to optimize bias or total error in estimation of particular quantities. To facilitate such optimization, one
can further treat the clusters, or some other model fit to the network (e.g., a more general stochastic block
model (Karrer and Newman, 2011)), as an approximation to the observed network. Thus, Basse and Airoldi
(2015) propose using optimal designs for approximations to the observed network.
A final design possibility with subject-level treatment randomizations is that treatment assignment
probabilities can depend on pre-treatment covariates Xi in order to increase precision. Blocking or pre-
stratification exactly balances some covariates between treatments, rather than simply balancing them in
expectation, thus reducing the variance in effect estimates is attributable to the random assignment of treat-
ments causing covariate imbalance in small samples (Gerber and Green, 2012, ch. 4). For instance, in a
small sample it could make a large difference in estimates if a subject who is very active or who has
many friends is assigned to treatment or not. State-of-the-art blocking methods allow improving balancing
on high-dimensional covariates and lead to higher-precision estimates of treatment effects (Higgins et al,
2016). While usually large samples make blocking irrelevant because post-stratification or regression ad-
justment can provide similar precision gains (Miratrix et al, 2013), use of graph cluster randomization again
reduces the effective number of units being randomized, perhaps making blocking a relevant design consid-
eration.
Pre-treatment covariates can be used to target specific subjects who may have certain network positions
or be likelier to cause social influence based on some hypothesis or prior analysis. If a researcher wanted
to test a seeding strategy based on network position a reasonable design would be select a set of influential
candidate subjects (Kempe et al, 2003) and treat a random fraction of them while reserving some others as
a control (cf. Kim et al, 2015; Beaman et al, 2015).
2.3.3 Interaction-level treatment randomization
Treatments defined at the level of individual edges allow for further choices in randomization. Because this
design space is so large, we consider some notable examples.
Historically, many examples of interaction-level treatments come from experiments in the formation of
random groups. Here the interaction network is set in advance by the researcher or by some exogenous
process. From a notational standpoint, these designs amount to setting Wi j = 1 for blocks of subjects to
induce variation in Ai j and, in turn, the distribution of quantities such as the fraction of adopting peers,
∑Nj=1D jA¯i j. An important aspect of this type of randomization is that the resulting groups must exhibit
variance onD j, the behavior of interest. For the same reason that i.i.d. assignment in subject-level treatments
may not cause sufficient variation in peer exposures, large random groups are unlikely to be useful for
identifying causal effects (cf. Angrist, 2014). As with subject-level treatments above, it may be desirable to
introduce overdispersion in group composition.
The random group assignment designs generally leverage existing group formation policies. In the case
of Sacerdote (2001), which exploits the fact that roommate assignments at Dartmouth college are condition-
ally randomly assigned (directly setting Ai j = 1 for the “is roommate” relation), we may even consider this
a natural experiment. On the other hand, Carrell et al (2009, 2011) introduce novel group formation policies
for squadrons at the United States Air Force Academy; here squadrons are groups of roughly 30 that cadets
are required to spend the majority of their time with. As a further refinement, random group formation can
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be performed dynamically to allow for repeated measurements of the same individuals as they change social
contexts. Hasan and Koning (2017) use such a randomization to measure how group interactions between
entrepreneurs affects their ideation. Their approach allows them to not only measure how changing groups
affects their outcome of interest, but allows for longitudinal measurements of individual outcomes as well.
Without leveraging existing group formation policies, researchers may be limited to encouraging the
formation edges that involve less prolonged contact. Several experiments have randomly assigned subjects
to different graph structures whether in an artificial setting (e.g., Kearns et al, 2006) or in the context of an
online health-related service (Centola, 2010). Here the experiment is generally conceptualized at the level
of entire replications of a particular graph. Thus, the outcomes and analyses may be defined and conducted
in aggregate rather than at the individual level. One can think of these designs as randomizing A directly
and then observing some aggregate network outcome, which is slightly more complex than the framework
we propose here.
Other edge-level treatments are best understood as conditional on peer behaviors and a pre-treatment
network. These include what we have called mechanism experimental designs, which work by randomizing
whether a social signal is delivered via particular channel. Mechanism designs (e.g., Bakshy et al, 2012b;
Aral and Walker, 2012; Bond et al, 2012) are equipped to answer counterfactuals about how peer behavior
would be affected in the amplification or attenuation of the influence channel of interest.6 For example, in
Bakshy et al (2012a), the only peers eligible for the experiment are those who have already liked a page on
Facebook (conditioning on D j = 1) and the randomization (assigningWi j as a Bernoulli random variable
with perfect compliance for Ai j) determines whether this behavior will be displayed when the focal user
sees an ad. Aral and Walker (2012) use another mechanism design in exploiting the fact that notifications
in their Facebook application are delivered to a random set of the user’s friends. If we believe that these
notifications are the only mechanism through which a Facebook friend might adopt the application, this
amounts to randomly amplifying values of Ai j for the friends who received the notifications, while leaving it
un-amplified for the remaining Facebook friends that were collected when the user installed the application.
Just because a treatment is defined at the level of edges not mean the randomization is i.i.d at the edge
level. Bakshy et al (2012a) select random subsets of edges involving the same subject. In the context of a
treatment that encourages providing feedback (likes and comments on Facebook, in this case) to a specified
directed edge, Eckles et al (2016) compare different possible randomizations. One sender-clustered design
would randomly assign vertices to an encouragement to give all of their peers more feedback. Another
recipient-clustered design would randomly assign vertices to have all of their peers encouraged to give
them feedback This latter design is used in Eckles et al (2016), as simulations suggest it will often have
precision advantages. Finally, other designs could, like some of the designs we considered in the previous
section, interpolate between i.i.d. assignment of edges and either of these clustered designs.
2.4 Outcome measurement
Perhaps an underrated requirement of randomized experiments is the ability to measure an outcome appro-
priate to the research question at hand. Sometimes researchers invest more time and expense in intervening
with their treatment than in measuring the outcome. However, precise, valid, and complete measurement
plays a large role in the success of randomized experiments.
A simple example is that, if outcomes are measured with noise, the resulting estimates will be less
precise. Even more problematic are cases where some outcomes are missing, either randomly or not.
Coey and Bailey (2016) show that matching ad exposures to conversions via cookies — where matching is
random but plausibly independent of treatment status — results in a substantial loss of experimental power.
Other experiments might rely on surveys or self-reports to measure outcomes, which yields either a biased
measurement (e.g., social desirability) or a treatment effect estimate for only a biased sub-population (sur-
vey takers). Berry and Taylor (2017), who study social influence for comment quality in public discussions,
can only measure comment quality improvements for the set of subjects who choose to write comments.
Bond et al (2012) measure voter turnout by matching Facebook users to people in the state voter files,
which is a noisy process (match rates were about 40%) that was limited to 13 states because of the expense
of acquiring voter file data.
Digital field experiments present some opportunities and also limitations for experimenters. Many im-
portant outcomes are potentially observable, such as clicks on ads Bakshy et al (2012a), sharing and pro-
6 An additional refinement of the model we outline here is subjects may be connected via multiple overlapping networks, such
as in-person vs online interactions, and an experiment may cause changes in some of those networks but not others.
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duction of user-generated content (Bakshy et al, 2012b; Eckles et al, 2016), and adoption of apps (both
free and paid) (Aral and Walker, 2011; Bapna and Umyarov, 2015). However, digital platforms create com-
prehensive logs of digital behaviors, which are perhaps not the only behaviors of theoretical interest. For
instance, while Kramer et al (2014) apply a reasonable text-analysis procedure to measure people’s emo-
tions at scale, it is debatable whether a change in emotion is adequately captured by the text they choose to
share on Facebook (Beasley and Mason, 2015). The sheer volume of data produced on digital platforms is
a signal of how trivial the actions they collect can be. Despite dramatic advances in observability of human
behavior, it continues to be a central research challenge to measure important outcomes and join them to
experimentally assigned treatments.
3 Analyzing randomized experiments
One frequent consequence of having a well-designed randomized experiment is that the data analysis is then
straightforward. While this is true to some degree in experiments about social influence in networks, esti-
mation and inference can both be complicated by the network. Causal and statistical inference in networks
remains an active research area, with contemporary contributions to basic problems such as laws of large
numbers and asymptotic inference in networks (Leung, 2017; Aronow and Samii, 2017; Tchetgen et al,
2017; van der Laan, 2014).
In this section, we review methods for estimation and inference (e.g., hypothesis testing) for social
influence in network experiments. The known randomization of subjects or edges to treatments provides a
“reasoned basis” for inference (Fisher, 1935, p. 14) with minimal assumptions even when we only observe
a network with a single giant component. We thus focus on Fisherian randomization inference, but briefly
review other methods.
As with the experimental design, the primary goal in analysis is learning about social influence. Ideally,
this means learning about effects of D j on Yi or of Ai j on Yi. It will often be more straightforward to simply
detect any effects of Z j or Wi j on Yi. This is because (a) the experimenter sets these, but usually only
affects D j on Yi indirectly and (b) in measuring D j and Ai j, we may not capture all of the ways that our
treatments can affect subjects. Thus, we can often take evidence about effects of Z j orWi j as evidence of
social influence, without being about to denominate these effects in terms of peer behaviors. We start with
this simpler case.
3.1 Effects of randomized treatments
In this section, we consider how to conduct inference about effects of randomized treatments. We start by
considering inference about spillovers in experiments where subjects are randomly assigned to subject-level
treatments; that is, we are interested in questions about whether subjects’ outcomes are affected by others’
treatments. If we assume that others’ treatment only affect an individual through others’ behaviors (Figure
2.1), then these tests are also tests of social influence.
3.1.1 Testing sharp null hypotheses about spillovers
Consider the null model in which there is a direct effect of a subject’s own treatment, but no effects of
others’ treatments, including those of peers.
Hypothesis 1 (No spillovers with constant direct effects) There exists some τ such that Yi(zi) = τzi+ ξi
for all z ∈ ZN and i ∈V.
Note that under this null hypothesis Yi− τZi does not vary under alternative treatment assignments. This
null hypothesis is a composite of null hypotheses of the form:
Hypothesis 2 (No spillovers with constant direct effects, τ0) Yi(zi) = τ0zi+ ξi for all z ∈ Z
N and i ∈V.
Hypothesis 2 is a sharp null hypothesis, which allows inferring all of a unit’s potential outcomes from its
single, observed potential outcome.We can thus use Fisherian randomization inference, in which we exploit
our knowledge of the distribution of Z (which we or the experimenter chose), to test this null hypothesis.
This is often implemented as a permutation test with a test statistic chosen to be sensitive to the kinds of
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deviations from the null that we expect. For example, consider a larger model that includes a linear effect
of the fraction of treated peers:
Yi = τZi+ρ
N
∑
j=1
Z jA¯i j+ ξi (1)
where A¯i j is an entry in the row normalized adjacencymatrix. A non-zeroρ would correspond to a particular
violation of Hypothesis 1. The score statistic for ρ can be used as a test statistic (Athey et al, 2017), as can
many other test statistics.
Algorithm 1 tests Hypothesis 2 using Fisherian randomization inference. To test Hypothesis 1, re-
searchers would generally test many particular values of τ (e.g., in a grid, or through a search algorithm)
and take the supremum.
Algorithm 1 (Randomization inference for Hypothesis 2) Inputs: test statistic T (·, ·) :YN×{0,1}N that
is a function of units’ residual outcomes and the treatment vector; posited direct effect τ0.
1. Compute residual outcomes given τ0, Y˜ := Y − τ0Z.
2. For every r ∈ {1, ...,R} and some τ0:
a. Draw a new treatment vector Z∗ consistent with the original randomization.
b. Compute value of test statistic with observed outcomes and permuted treatment Tnull,r := T (Y˜ ,Z∗).
3. Compare observed and null test statistics, yielding
p̂-value(τ0) =
1
R
R
∑
r=1
1{T (Y˜ ,Z)> Tnull,r}.
We would then reject Hypothesis 2 for small p-values, instead concluding subjects are affected by others’
treatments.
Remark 1 (Randomization inference and permutation tests). While randomization inference frequently
makes use of permutation tests, the two are not identical. Fisherian randomization inference makes use of
knowledge about the exact distribution of variables that were randomized to conduct exact causal inference
for a finite population of units. Often (e.g. with a single completely randomized treatment vector) this can
be approximated to arbitrary precision through permutation of the treatment vector, but need not be if the
distribution over treatments is more complicated. Furthermore, permutation tests of social influence are of-
ten used without the justification they are afforded by randomization; that is, they are often used when other
assumptions would be needed to make them exact in finite samples or even good asymptotic approxima-
tions. For example, Anagnostopoulos et al (2008) make additional, strong assumptions about non-influence
processes to justify the use of a permutation test to detect influence in observational data.
Even in the case of randomized experiments, particular permutation tests may not be readily justified by
the randomization. Without explicitly considering the relevant sharp null hypothesis, it can be easy to make
mistakes that make the resulting permutation test invalid. For example, Bond et al (2012) test for spillovers
from a randomly assigned encouragement to vote in the 2010 U.S. elections. This was implemented as as a
permutation test that implicitly assumed the absence of direct effects, even though Bond et al (2012) else-
where rejected that null hypothesis. Athey et al (2017) show that such tests can have dramatically inflated
Type I error rates (i.e. they too often reject the null hypothesis when it is true).
3.1.2 Inference for the magnitude of spillovers
Say we use Algorithm 1 and reject Hypothesis 1. We may further wish to quantify the magnitude of these
spillovers from treatment. These methods can also be used to construct acceptance regions for more complex
positive hypotheses about the size of spillovers in the network. To do this, we can use a similar test but with
Equation 1 specifying a sharp null hypothesis given a choice of τ and ρ . We can, for example, use a test
statistic that measures model fit (e.g., sum of squared residuals) (Bowers et al, 2016) and determine a region
of τ and ρ values that we do not reject (i.e. an acceptance region). With only these two parameters, grid
search is often feasible, but other search algorithms can be used. For more on this topic, see Bowers et al
(2013) and Bowers et al (2016).
The preceding methods require testing a sharp null hypothesis or a composite null consisting of a para-
metrically defined set of sharp nulls. In particular, we imposed the constant effects assumption that the
direct effect of the treatment τ was common to all units. If direct effects are heterogeneous, these tests
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could reject the null even when there are no spillover effects of treatment. To partially address this concern,
we could expand the null model to allow effects to be heterogeneous by observed subject covariates Xi;
however, this would not allow for latent heterogeneity in direct effects. Outside the context of networks,
we might be confident that, at least asymptotically, good choices of test statistics would result in tests that
are not asymptotically sensitive to this heterogeneity (Chung and Romano, 2013); however, we lack such
asymptotic results for networks. In the next sections, we consider alternative methods that do not make
use of these homogeneity assumptions. Nonetheless, the preceding methods may have some advantages in
practice (e.g., greater power).
3.1.3 Conditional randomization inference in networks
How can we use randomization inference to test for spillovers without specifying the form of direct effects?
Consider a null hypothesis of no spillovers in the absence of assumptions about constant direct effects of
treatment.
Hypothesis 3 (No spillovers) Yi(z) =Yi(z
′) for all i ∈V, and all pairs of assignment vectors z,z′ ∈ {0,1}N
such that zi = z
′
i.
This hypothesis is not sharp because it does not specify how each subject would have behaved if its treatment
were different. Rather, it posits levels sets of Yi(·). It is possible to test such non-sharp null hypotheses by
using conditional randomization inference — that is, by conditioning on functions of the treatment vector
Z (Rosenbaum, 1984; Aronow, 2012; Athey et al, 2017).
Here consider the basic case of testing Hypothesis 3. In particular, we can designate a subset of subjects
as focal subjects for which we examine their outcomes and condition on their observed treatment assignment
(Aronow, 2012; Athey et al, 2017). Note that, conditional on the focal subjects receiving the same treatment,
Hypothesis 3 is now sharp for those subjects. We can implement this test as follows.
Algorithm 2 (Conditional randomization inference for Hypothesis 2) Inputs: set of focal units VF ∈V,
test statistic T (·, ·) :Y|VF |×{0,1}N that is a function of focal units’ outcomes and the treatment vector.
1. Draw permuted treatment vector Z∗ such that all focal units get the same treatment as observed, Z∗i = Zi
for all i ∈VF
2. Compute value of test statistic with observed outcomes and permuted treatment T (YVF ,Z
∗)
3. Repeat 1 and 2 for R times, storing results as the R-vector Tnull.
4. Compare observed and null test statistics, yielding
p-value=
1
R
R
∑
r=1
1{T (YVF ,Z)> Tnull,r}.
We would then reject Hypothesis 3, and thus the stronger Hypothesis 1, for small values of this p-value.
This test has the correct Type I error rate without any assumptions about the model for direct effects.
How should the focal subjects be selected? Any choice is valid (i.e. results in correct Type I error rates),
but this choice can affect power. First, in some cases, this choice may be obvious because of the availabil-
ity of outcome data. For example, when joining treatment and network data with a second data set with
outcomes, a researcher may only observe outcomes for a small fraction of subjects, which could then be
designated the focal subjects (e.g., Jones et al, 2017). Second, theory or prior observations may suggest
that some subject may not respond to social influence; it may be desirable to not include them as focal
units. Finally, the network itself can be used to select focal subjects to improve power (Athey et al, 2017;
Basse and Feller, 2017).
It is possible to apply similar approaches to testing for higher-order spillovers, testing for spillovers on a
second network, and other hypotheses about spillovers. When the null hypothesis allows for, e.g., spillovers
from immediate neighbors on a relatively dense network, these methods may lack sufficient power to be
useful. We refer readers to Athey et al (2017) for details.
3.1.4 Extension to edge-level treatments
We have focused on the case where subjects, rather than edges, are assigned to treatments; however, similar
methods can be used when edges are assigned as long as either (a) a sharp null hypothesis can be posited or
(b) a non-sharp null hypothesis implies level sets that can be conditioned on.
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3.2 Estimating effects of peer behaviors
Thus far we have described inference about effects of other subjects’ randomly assigned treatments, while
often the substantive questions are about effects of other subjects’ behaviors (i.e. social influence). As noted
above, if we assume that a subject’s outcome is only affected by a peers’ treatments via their behaviors, then
evidence for spillovers from treatment is evidence for social influence. However, we are often interesting in
quantifying the size of this social influence by, e.g., estimating effects of D j or Ai j on Yi.
We can proceed as before by considering the following sharp null hypothesis, which specifies how a
subject’s outcomes vary with its own treatment and peers’ behaviors.
Hypothesis 4 (Constant direct effects and social influence, (τ0, θ0))
Yi(z,d) = τ0zi+θ0
N
∑
j=1
d jA¯i j+ ξi, (2)
for all z ∈ {0,1}N, d ∈ DN , and i ∈ v.
According to Hypothesis 4, subjects are unaffected by others’ treatments except as reflected in their
neighbors behaviors D j. This a complete mediation assumption or exclusion restriction and is encoded
in Figure 2.1. Combined with Z having been randomized, this is sufficient for function of Z to be used
as instrumental variables for social influence. Following Imbens and Rosenbaum (2005), we can then test
Hypothesis 4 by noting that it implies that Yi(z,d)− τ0zi − θ0 ∑
N
j=1 d jA¯i j is invariant in z, and thus that
Algorithm 1 can be applied with this alternative residualization of the outcomes.
3.3 Other methods of analysis
There are some other methods available for statistical inference about spillovers and social influence with
randomized experiments. Under monotonicity assumptions (i.e. that treating more subjects can only in-
crease all subjects’ potential outcomes) and with bounded outcomes, it is possible to construct confidence
intervals for effects attributable to the observed treatment assignment (Choi, 2017). Or under local interfer-
ence assumptions (i.e. subjects are only affected by immediate peers’ treatments) and bounded degree, it is
possible to do conservative asymptotic inference (Aronow and Samii, 2017; van der Laan, 2014).
In some cases the presence of replication is helpful by allowing for plausible independence assumptions.
First, there may be observation of multiple plausibly independent behaviors on a single network. For ex-
ample, Bakshy et al (2012a) randomize a mechanism of social influence for many different subjects and
brands. In their estimation and statistical inference, they assume that outcomes that do not have a common
subject or brand are independent. They then use statistical methods that account for dependence of obser-
vations within brands and users (Bakshy and Eckles, 2013; Cameron et al, 2011; Owen and Eckles, 2012).
Ignoring or not properly accounting for dependence in analyzing such experiments would increase the type
I error rate.
Second, some networks consist of multiple sizable connected components (e.g., villages, schools), rather
than a single giant component. However, often the lack of edges between components is an artifact of how
the network is measured. For example, Kim et al (2015) measure kinship and friendship relationship among
rural villagers in Honduras, but edges between villages are not measured. On the other hand, Cai et al (2015)
measure inter-village edges, but nonetheless only allow for within-village dependence when conducting
statistical inference. Thus, independence remains a potentially strong assumption.
4 Interpretation and additional analyses
The simplest possible randomized experiment with a binary treatment (i.e. an “A/B test”) could be used
to estimate as little as a single causal parameter of interest — the average treatment effect. In many cases
researchers have found that this is an unsatisfying conclusion to a study, especially given the costs of de-
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signing, planning, and implementing7 randomized field experiments. Therefore it is common for empirical
researchers to conduct more extensive analysis of experimental data or to use it as input to models or sim-
ulations. We have found that the results of field experiments, though exhibiting high internal and external
validity, often motivate deeper questions about the underlying mechanism and alternative counterfactual
questions that can be explored through modeling or simulation.
In Section 3, we made assumptions about the structure of social influence and specified models or in-
ferential procedures to detect or estimate it. In most of these experiments we are more interested in how
the effect scales with number or proportion of friends who engage in a particular behavior. But beyond
estimation of that response curve, there are two other broad types of questions that can be answered by
experiments.
The first is treatment effect heterogeneity — the subpopulations of products, people, or social connec-
tions where social influence is stronger or weaker. By fitting more complex models researchers can estimate
heterogeneous treatment effects and these estimates can help suggest causal mechanisms or guide design
of marketing efforts or public policies, analogous to finding predictors of positive response to clinical treat-
ments in medicine.
The second is understanding optimal policies by simulating alternative policies. Policy simulations can
be used to extrapolate the results of randomized experiments to alternative policies which were never di-
rectly tested. They are most commonly used by economists who have a rich history of using structural8
models in order to measure the effects of potential policy changes.
4.1 Heterogeneous treatment effects
One obvious type of effect heterogeneity is what clinical researchers might call a dose-response function,
which characterizes how effects tend to scale as the number of friends who are influencing the person
varies (DeLean et al, 1978). Bakshy et al (2012a) look at a slightly different dose-response function: when
an influential social cue from a single peer is present, how does the effect size vary with the tie-strength of
that individual? This heterogeneity is important to understand because it can inform advertising strategies.
For instance, knowing that close friends are far more influential than random friends, we might design a
marketing campaign to encourage people to share with a small number of select friends rather than many
of them.
Another common analysis is measuring how influence may be moderated by the demographic character-
istics of the pair of people involved. For instance, Aral and Walker (2012) observe pairwise demographic
attributes of the message sender and recipient and use this information to measure how the relative effec-
tiveness of viral messages (Facebook notifications generated by app usage) varies as a means of identifying
more influential or susceptible members of social networks.
It is completely plausible that the average treatment effect can be zero, yet obscure significant positive
and negative treatment effects for many large subgroups that happen to cancel out. Taylor et al (2014) show
that the presence of some people’s identity cues causes their content to receive higher and lower ratings
than when their content is rendered anonymously. A distribution of effects that contains both positive and
negative values is plausible in many social environments with fixed resources, such as status, reputation, or
attention.
In all three of the aforementioned papers in this section, we would like to point out the effect heterogene-
ity does represent a “free” causal estimand. If the experiment is designed to measure the ATE (the average
treatment effect over the population), the effect heterogeneity we measure is simply an association between
certain subgroups of the experiment and differential effects. Researchers cannot make the claim that an
intervention designed to move a subject from one subgroup to another would change their treatment ef-
fect. For instance in Taylor et al (2014), the experiment tests the effects of anonymization of a commenter’s
identity on ratings, but is unable to answer questions about what rating a person’s content would receive if
she had some alternate identity. This type of counterfactual question is precisely the type of treatment effect
heterogeneity that would drive policy decisions in the social advertising space. Such a finding can only be
7 One should realistically add to this list of costs, the expected cost of failure. Researchers have not always succeeded in
salvaging scientific knowledge from experiments and complexity of field experiments is associated with greater risk of unex-
pected problems.
8 Here we mean structural in the sense of imposing economic “structure,” meaning that assumptions about human behavior
derived from theory are imposed in the models.
Randomized experiments 19
measured by a more complicated experiment which randomizes which identity is presented among some
set of choices – a much more difficult experiment to design and implement.
We end this section with a note of warning about seeking results based on treatment effect heterogene-
ity. As researchers search dimensions by which treatment effects may exhibit differential effects, they may
increase the rate of false discovery. Independently testing many heterogeneity on many possible dimen-
sions, or for many subgroups of the experiment will invariably result in false positive results as one of
the subgroups may be “lucky.”9 There are reasonable methods to control this risk while still detecting in-
teresting heterogeneity, see Athey and Imbens (2015) for a detailed discussion and recent methodological
development.
4.2 Policy simulations
Given the obvious importance of experiments for effective policy decisions, it is natural to ask for a policy
recommendation at the conclusion of a study based on a randomized experiment. Often a policy recom-
mendation is not directly recoverable from causal quantities of interest. For instance, the average treatment
effect (ATE) might tell you that the treatment has a positive effect on some outcome on average, but it does
not necessarily follow that everyone should receive the treatment. Treatments have costs which might need
to be weighed and nature of social spillovers means that treating a friend of an individual can be a substitute
or a complement for treating that individual directly.
Ryan and Tucker (2012) report policy simulations, employing models containing economic structure
based on assumptions about individual behavior in the presence of peer effects (Hartmann, 2010). The key
idea behind the policy simulation approach is that the experiment is used to estimate parameters of the
model and then the model can be used to extrapolate the findings to more complex or interesting policies
than those randomly set in the original data set. Policy simulations are often used in conjunctionwith natural
experiment, where the researcher did not ex ante decide the most informative randomization and would like
to answer some additional questions at the cost of imposing additional assumptions through a model.
Another example of reporting policy simulations is Aral et al (2013), which applies experimental es-
timates from Aral and Walker (2012) to form the basis of an optimal seeding strategy in networks. As a
key feature, their experiment estimated the degree to which influence and susceptibility to influence were
clustered in the network, which is an important feature for understanding diffusion processes.
5 Conclusion
We believe that valid causal inference is an important goal in the practice of social science. There is obvious
utility in knowing causal structure — good policy decisions require that the policy-maker at least know the
sign of a causal effect. But also from a purely scientific perspective, measurements which do not have
causal interpretation lack usefulness and insight because they afford multiple explanations. Correlations are
interesting, but they usually cannot uniquely identify an explanation for a social phenomenon.
We admit there is perhaps a bit of experimental dogma present in the social sciences and it is often
possible to satisfyingly answer questions through some combination of reasonable assumptions, models,
and observational data. However, the realm of social influence is one where alternative explanations are
difficult to rule out without some exogenous variation which can identify causal effects. Manzi (2012)
refers to this problematic aspect of human behavior as “high causal density.” In domains of high causal
density, where there are highly dense causal graphs that can explain the observed associations in data we
collect, credible causal claims require randomization, either by the researcher or by nature.
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